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6 December 1965

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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


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
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## Southwestern China



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Communist China: Recently stepped-up Chinese Communist jet fighter activity opposite Taiwan and efforts to rehabilitate two airfields just south of the Taiwan Strait indicate that Peking is attempting to strengthen its air defenses in the area.

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The increased air activity during November may be explained in part by good flying weather and may also reflect increased sensitivity resulting from the defection of an IL-28 (Beagle) jet light bomber crew to Taiwan on 13 November. Rehabilitation of the airfields, however, appears to be part of an effort to improve over-all defenses against the possibility of air attack.

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USSR: [The USSR used the visit of British Foreign Secretary Stewart to reiterate its concern over unresolved problems in Europe and indicate its frustration over the limits placed on political initiatives by the Vietnam conflict.]

[According to UK Ambassador Harrison, the Soviet leaders received Stewart with a personal warmth which contrasted with the relative coolness of Soviet public treatment of the visit. In keeping with Moscow's intention to avoid public divergence from Hanoi's position, the Soviet press repeatedly emphasized that British policy in Vietnam prevented the development of closer ties. Foreign Minister Gromyko, however, went out of his way in private to express the desire for "very friendly relations" and an increase in all kinds of contacts.]

[On the question of European security, Soviet Premier Kosygin stressed that "nuclear sharing" would strengthen NATO and lead to increased tension in which a nonproliferation agreement would be more difficult to achieve. Gromyko, however, indicated Moscow's continuing interest in such an agreement. He told Stewart that the USSR is still willing to discuss this subject outside the existing disarmament forums.]

[Although the Russians recently have been playing up the risks posed by alleged US military actions in Laos, they did not discuss this question with Stewart in any detail. On Vietnam, Gromyko reiterated Moscow's standard position that it is not empowered by North Vietnam to speak on this subject. The British received the strong impression that he was upset by his lack of room for maneuvering on Vietnam.]

Sino-Soviet Dispute: The Russians have been able to exploit China's open refusal to work out a joint policy with the USSR on Vietnam in their efforts to secure vigorous public support from all of Moscow's Eastern European allies except Rumania.

Recent attacks on Communist China by the Polish and Hungarian Communist parties reflect the growing concern in Eastern Europe over the Vietnam situation and the limitations it places on relations with the West.

The willingness of the Polish party to resume polemics against the Chinese last Friday, after more than two years, not only points to China's vulnerability to such attacks but is also a further reflection of Moscow's more effective working relationship with East European leaders. It provides a new demonstration of the degree to which the Chinese have become isolated.

An editorial broadcast by the Hungarians on 4 December reflected satisfaction with "methodical endeavors" by the Soviet leaders to consult on problems of importance to all. Both the Hungarian and Polish editorials followed the Soviet lead in tying their calls for bloc unity to the necessity for supporting North Vietnam.

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Indonesia: The political impasse between Sukarno and the army shows no sign of early resolution.

Although some adjustment is evident on both sides, the two factions continue an uncompromising position on major issues.

Pressures on Sukarno by the military and political parties during the past ten days for the definitive banning of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and a reformulation of Indonesian policies have elicited no positive response. Instead, in making a speech on 4 December Sukarno appeared--as described by the US Embassy--"defiant, confident, and totally unreconstructed."

Sukarno did not mention either the PKI or China in the course of his hour-long speech to graduates at the Air Force Staff and Command School. The major theme of his address was a reiteration of his warning against efforts to change the leftist course of the revolution. He stated that he would ban any party which continued to disrupt national unity and to incite the people to attack each other. Significantly, he gave as examples only the Catholic and Christian parties and IPKI, a small army-backed political organization.

Sukarno told the air force graduates that the school must reflect Asian experience and reality. He ridiculed American military doctrine and said that the United States will fail in Vietnam.

General Nasution, defense minister and chief of staff of the armed forces, told a parliamentary commission on 4 December that the replacement of cabinet ministers is Sukarno's responsibility. He also told the commission that a reorganization of air force leadership is under way but that no decision has been reached on "achieving order in the state's secret agencies."

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Communist China, after repeated warnings to Djakarta on the treatment of Chinese diplomatic personnel and Overseas Chinese in Indonesia, has stopped delivery of machinery for a cotton spinning mill it was building in West Java, according to an Indonesian textiles official. Chinese experts who were working on the project have been withdrawn.

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Brazil: The inauguration of Guanabara Governor Negrao de Lima on 5 December has probably strengthened President Castello Branco's authority over the military at least temporarily.

The government appears confident that with Negrao de Lima's investiture the danger of a showdown with hard-line military leaders has receded. A military court must still rule, however, on a request for the governor's arrest on charges that he has been involved with the Communist Party. According to the US Embassy, Castello Branco is virtually certain to accept whatever decision the court makes.

Despite his apparent victory, Castello Branco will continue to face heavy pressure from the hardline for a stronger stand against corruption and subversion. The continuing strain in the relationship between the President and War Minister Costa e Silva will make it more difficult for Castello Branco to keep such pressure under control.

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\*France: De Gaulle's failure to obtain an absolute majority of the votes in the presidential elections Sunday has forced him into a run-off election for the presidency against Francois Mitterrand on 19 December.

On the basis of provisional official returns, De Gaulle received a surprisingly low 44 percent of the vote. The Socialist and Communist-backed Mitterrand, whose showing was unexpectedly strong, ran second with 32 percent. Third with 16 percent was Jean Lecanuet, the center candidate backed by the Catholic-oriented Popular Republic Movement.

De Gaulle and Mitterrand are formally designated as the candidates for the second ballot but either may withdraw anytime through Thursday. In the event of a withdrawal Lecanuet, as the third-ranking candidate, would move up as the contender on the 19th. If both De Gaulle and Mitterrand stay in the race, the outcome will in part depend on whether Lecanuet formally endorses one of the candidates and asks his supporters to vote for that man.

Regardless of the outcome of the second ballot, the low percentage accorded De Gaulle in the first round constitutes a sharp blow to his personal prestige and leadership.

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Kuwait: The new cabinet of Kuwait appears to represent a balance between the two contending branches of the ruling family. Two ministers belong to the branch of the new ruler, Amir Sabah, and two are from the branch of the recently appointed prime minister, Sheikh Jabir al-Ahmad; the remainder are commoners carried over from the previous cabinet. This arrangement indicates that Kuwait will try to maintain its present balance between traditional Kuwaiti conservatism and the more liberal tendencies now arising in the Arab world.

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\*Yemen: The initial deadlock at the Yemen peace conference may have ended. Discussion of the first topic on the agenda finally began at yesterday's session, according to press reports, following requests from both sides for a resumption of the formal talks which recessed on 30 November. Pressure from Nasir and Faysal probably persuaded the conferees to set aside their disagreement over preliminary issues and proceed with the agenda.

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The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

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Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U. S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

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The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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